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"Firm Connectivity and Demands for Trade Protection under Global Value Chains" (under review).
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Much of the literature assumes that firms within each domestic industry will uniformly support antidumping (AD) duties, a trade policy used globally to shield domestic industries from foreign competition. I find that many firms remain silent or oppose AD petitions in the US. I provide a firm-level theory of how a firm’s foreign business connections shape its incentives over AD protection. Domestic firms that source inputs from a targeted exporter expect AD duties to flow back to them through the supply chain, so their losses from protection exceed any gains, and they withhold support for the petition. I test the theory on a firm-level dataset covering every domestic firm in U.S. AD cases between 2010 and 2020, matching firm records to millions of customs shipments that capture their foreign connections. Firms that source production inputs from the targeted country are less likely to join the petition, while firms that import the same product the petition targets are not. Beyond firm characteristics, trade-policy preferences also form at the firm-target dyad. The same firm joins one petition and sits out another against a different country.
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"Government-imposed Restrictions on International Economic Relations" with Timothy Peterson and Dursun Peksen (under review).
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This paper introduces the "Government-imposed Restrictions on International Economic Relations" (GRIER) dataset. Existing data projects have been instrumental in identifying episodes of economic coercion. However, legacy data are limited in their ability to account for substantive heterogeneity and temporal evolution of specific economic restrictions imposed, which has limited scholars' ability to study the increasingly complex nature of sanctions over time. Using each restriction (i.e., the specific banned interaction across international borders) as the unit of analysis, the GRIER dataset codes all government-mandated restrictions by the EU, the UN, and the U.S. for the years spanning 1992 to 2026. With a discussion of coding procedures and illustrations of summary statistics, we demonstrate that the GRIER dataset will help researchers test novel theories on the use, effectiveness, and consequences of sanctions on all sanctioned entities (e.g., states, individuals, and firms).
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"Economic Sanctions and Human Welfare in Target Countries" with Dursun Peksen (book chapter, under review).
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What effects do economic sanctions have on socio-economic and political conditions in target (sanctioned) countries? Which groups and segments of target societies tend to get hurt or benefit the most from sanctions? To probe these inquiries, this chapter offers a review of relevant academic work on the consequences of sanctions for target populations. At the macro level, this chapter discusses how sanctions might affect economic growth, poverty, income inequality, public health, and the welfare of marginalized groups. It also examines political consequences, including changes in human rights conditions, democratic governance, and political violence. At the micro level, the chapter reviews a growing body of experimental and survey-based research on how citizens in target and sanctioning countries perceive and respond to sanctions, including rally-around-the-flag effects and political polarization. This review of extant literature suggests that though sanctions are potent instruments when it comes to inflicting "civilian pain," the sanctions-induced pain is likely to be felt disproportionately by citizens outside the ruling circle of target governments.
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"Who Paid for the US-China Trade War? Evidence from Section 301 Tariffs" with Todd Allee.).